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As many of you know, the Missouri Legislature has passed, and
Governor Blunt has signed, sweeping changes in Missouri’s
Workers’ Compensation Law. Most of these have an effective date
of August 28, 2005. Over the next few months, I will continue
to update you as to what I believe to be important changes in
the law, changes that will profoundly effect the rights of
injured employees, particularly Local 2665.
Some of the most critical changes involve the area
of “notice”, the statutory requirement that an employee notify
his employer of an accident or the diagnosis of a condition in
the case of repetitive trauma or occupational disease.
The statutory language reads as follows: (Bracketed
items were a part of the prior law and have been removed from
the new law). Please note the shaded (highlighted) portions of
the statute:
I.
§287.020 RSMo
1.
The word “employee” as used in this chapter shall be construed
to mean every person in the service of any employer, as defined
in this chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied,
oral or written, or under any appointment or election, including
executive officers of corporations. Any reference to any
employee who has been injured shall, when the employee is dead,
also include his dependents, and other persons to whom
compensation may be payable. The word “employee” shall also
include all minors who work for an employer, whether or not such
minors are employed in violation of law, and all such minors are
hereby made of full age for all purposes under, in connection
with, or arising out of this chapter. The word “employee” shall
not include an individual who is the owner ,as defined in
subsection 43 of section 301.010, RSMo, and operator of a
motor vehicle which is leased or contracted with a driver to a
for-hire [common or contract] motor [vehicle] carrier operating
within a commercial zone as defined in section 390.020 or
390.041, RSMo, or operating under a certificate issued by the
[motor carrier and railroad safety division of the department of
economic development] Missouri department of transportation
or by the [interstate commerce commission] United States
Department of Transportation, or any of its subagencies.
2.
The word “accident” as used in this chapter shall [unless a
different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be
construed to] mean an unexpected [or unforseen identifiable
event or series of events happening suddenly and violently, with
or without human fault,] traumatic event or unusual strain
identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing
at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a
specific event during a single work shift.[An injury is
compensable if it is clearly work related. An injury is clearly
work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of
the resulting medical condition or disability.] An injury is not
compensable [merely] because work was a triggering or
precipitating factor.
3.
(1) In this chapter the term “injury” is hereby defined to be an
injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment.
[The injury must be incidental to and not independent of the
relation of the employer and employee. Ordinary, gradual
deterioration or progressive degeneration of the body caused by
aging shall not be compensable, except where the deterioration
or degeneration follows as an incident of employment.] An
injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the
prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical
condition and disability. “The prevailing factor” is defined to
be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing
both the resulting medical condition and disability.
(2) An injury shall
be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment
only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent,
upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the
[employment] accident is [a substantial] the
prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) [It can
be seen to have been followed as a natural incident of the work;
and
(c) It can
be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and]
(d) It does
not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to
which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and
unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life;
(3) An
injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes
is not compensable;
(4) A
cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other disease, or
cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction suffered by a
worker is an injury only if the accident is the prevailing
factor in causing the resulting medical condition;
(5)
The terms “injury” and “personal injuries” shall mean violence
to the physical structure of the body and to the personal
property which is used to make up the physical structure of the
body, such as artificial denture, artificial limbs, glass eyes,
eyeglasses, and other prostheses which are placed in or on the
body to replace the physical structure and such disease or
infection as naturally results therefrom. These terms shall in
no case except as specifically provided in this chapter be
construed to include occupational disease in any form, nor shall
they be construed to include any contagious or infectious
disease contracted during the course of the employment, nor
shall they include death due to natural causes occurring while
the workers is at work.
4. “Death”
when mentioned as a basis for the right to compensation means
only death resulting from such violence and its resultant
effects occurring withing three hundred weeks after the
accident; except that in the cases of occupational disease, the
limitation of three hundred weeks shall not be applicable.
5. [Without
otherwise affecting either the meaning or interpretation of the
abridged clause, “personal injuries arising out of an in the
course of employment”, it is hereby declared not to cover
workers except while engaged in or about the premises where
their duties are being performed , or where their services
require their presence as a part of such service.] Injuries
sustained in company-owned or subsidized automobiles in
accidents that occur while traveling from the employee’s home to
the employer’s principal place of business or from the
employer’s principal place of business to the employee’s home
are not compensable. The “extension of premises” doctrine is
abrogated to the extent it extends liability for accidents that
occur on property not owned or controlled by the employer even
if the accident occurs on customary, approved, permitted, usual
or accepted routs used by the employee to get to and from their
place of employment.
6. [A person
who is employed by the same employer for more than five and
one-half consecutive work days shall for the purpose of this
chapter be considered an “employee”.]
7. The term
“total disability” as used in this chapter shall mean inability
to return to any employment and not merely mean inability to
return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at
the time of the accident.
[8.] 7.
As used in this chapter and all acts amendatory thereof, the
term “commission”
shall
hereafter be construed as meaning and referring exclusivley to
the labor and industrial relations commission of Missouri, and
the term “director” shall hereafter be construed as meaning the
director of the department of insurance of the state or Missouri
or such agency of government as shall exercise the powers and
duties now conferred and imposed upon the department of
insurance of the state of Missouri.
[9.] 8. The term “division” as used in this chapter means
the division of workers’ compensation of the department of labor
and industrial relations of the state of Missouri.
[10] 9. For the purposes of this chapter, the term
“minor” means a person who has not attained the age of eighteen
years; except that, for the purpose of computing the
compensation provided for in this chapter, the provisions of
section 287.250 shall control.
10. In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the
intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate earlier case
law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of
“accident”, “occupational disease”, “arising out of”, and “in
the course of the employment” to include, but not limited to
holdings in: Bennet v. Columbia Health Care and
Rehabilitation, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002); Kasl
v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.banc 1999); and
Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.banc 1999) and all cases
citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
SUMMARY AND
RECOMMENDATION
The legislature was to make it more difficult for us to prevail
in these workers’ compensation claims. (The topic of “Notice”
will be discussed in this context in Part II of this memo).
An injury is compensable only if the “accident” which caused it
was the “prevailing factor”, which means the “primary factor” as
compared to other factors. What does this mean? The answer is
no one knows until new case law develops.
The bright side is that the injuries Local 2665 members
unfortunately sustain on the job are usually very well
documented and less difficult to establish as compensable.
The new law is full of tricks and traps designed to defeat
legitimate workers’ compensation claims. Do not let yourself be
a victim.
II §287.420 RSMo
(Notice)
No proceedings for compensation for any accident under
this chapter shall be maintained unless written notice of the
time, place and nature of the injury, and the name and address
of the person injured, [have] has been given to the
employer [as soon as practicable after the happening thereof but
not] no later than thirty days after the accident,
[unless the division or the commission finds that there was good
cause for failure to give notice, or that] unless the
employer was not prejudiced by failure to receive the notice.
[No defect or inaccuracy in the notice shall invalidate it
unless the commission finds that the employer in fact misled and
prejudiced thereby.] No proceedings for compensation for any
occupational disease or repetitive trauma under this chapter
shall be maintained unless written notice of the time, place,
and nature of the injury, and the name and address of the person
injured, has been given to the employer no later than thirty
days after the diagnosis of the condition unless the employee
can prove the employer was not prejudiced by failure to receive
the notice.
SUMMARY AND
RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to the new statute, the good cause exception has been
removed and the notice is an absolute requirement unless the
employer was not prejudiced. The burden of proof as to the lack
of prejudice will almost certainly rest with the employee after
the change.
Prior to the statutory changes, there was no notice requirement,
written or otherwise in occupational disease or repetitive
trauma claims. It should be noted that the notice window opens
as soon as the employee is diagnosed with the condition and
closes 30 days thereafter. Should an employee for instance, be
diagnosed with a mild case of carpal tunnel syndrome or a mild
case of epicondylitis notice must be given immediately, probably
to include the identity of the diagnosing physician in order to
be safe. This will be the case even if little or no treatment
is rendered.
It should also be noted that the burden of proof as to the lack
of employer’s prejudice definitely lies with the employee. It
should not be thought that the division determines that lack of
prejudice easily. The employee will almost certainly be held to
a strict standard in that regard. This is especially true given
the removal of the statutory language in Section 287.800 that
previously required liberal construction of the workers’
compensation law. The statute now must be strictly construed
and the employee receives no benefit of the doubt.
The changes in notice requirements in the new statute will
likely have profound impact on an employee’s right to file a
claim after August 28, 2005. The employer will not be required
to specify the notice requirements other than to tell employees
that failure to notify employer within 30 days may jeopardize
their ability to receive compensation and benefits. This
limited notice is simply not enough to provide a complete
picture for the employee.
RECOMMENDATION
People in the Fire Service have a greater risk of sustaining
repetitive injuries on the job. Our members aggravate already
injured body parts on a regular basis, simply by performing the
routine tasks of their jobs.
Under the old law, for example, a paramedic could make a claim
that he or she had developed carpal tunnel from years of
handling stretchers. The claim was made once and alleged the
injury was occupational and repetitive. That was enough for the
Division of Workers’ Compensation to consider that future on the
job incidents aggravating the same injury/illness were absorbed
into the pre-existing claim.
This is no longer the way it is under the new law. Now every
single time a previously injured body part is again injured, it
must be reported in writing within 30 days. If you fail to
report you will be denied medical treatment and compensation.
Worse, the employer will then seek to argue the incident/injury
you did not report was the one most responsible for your
condition.
The solution is to document even the smallest injuries or
aggravations of pre-existing injuries by filling out the Report
of Injury form which your employer is required to provide.
What we have is a bad law which has ridiculous consequences,
like creating the necessity for filing multiple and repeated
injury claims in order to preserve one’s rights under the
Workers’ Compensation system.
Please feel free to call me with any questions you might have
about Missouri Workers’ Compensation law in general, as well as
the unfortunate changes just made to it.
Your Workers’ Compensation referrals are much appreciated.
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